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A TALE OF THREE DAMAGE CAPS: Too MUCH, Too LITTLE
AND FINALLY JUST RIGHT
Medical malpractice damage caps have been proposed as
one way of solving the medical malpractice liability crisis. Af-
ter examining three different, but typical, damage caps, the Au-
thor constructs a model statute. This statute is favored be-
cause, on balance, it is more effective in solving the crisis and
more fair and desirable to the interested parties: insurance
companies, health care providers and medical malpractice vic-
tims. The model statute also avoids the constitutional infirmi-
ties that have befallen other damage caps.
IN THE AREA of medical malpractice, there recently has been
a myriad of tort reform measures as states across the nation
have struggled to find a "cure" for the perceived liability crisis.'
While legislatures have advanced many different proposals, one
common reform measure has been the damage cap, which is the
imposition of a limitation on the amount of damages that can be
recovered as a result of a single incident of medical malpractice.2
Part I of this Note considers a number of preliminary matters,
including a discussion of what kind of crisis exists and, after intro-
ducing the damage cap concept, the general effectiveness of dam-
age caps in alleviating the crisis. Part II analyzes the effectiveness,
fairness and desirability of damage cap provisions as enacted in
three states. Each presents a different variation on the same
theme, but none is without its weaknesses. For example, the Ohio
provision 3 would be effective, but is too burdensome for the victim;
the Wisconsin provision4 does not put enough of a burden on the
1. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislative
Reform: A National Survey, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1053 (1987) (analyzing constitutional
challenges raised against a variety of medical malpractice reform measures).
2. See, e.g., Note, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group: Future Trends in Damage
Limitation Adjudication, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1643, 1652-55 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Fu-
ture Trends] (reviewing several legislatively imposed caps and treatment received by the
courts of several states).
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984).
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 1989).
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victim to be effective. Although the Washington provision' pro-
vides a unique concept for limiting damages, it is not without
faults as well. In addition, each statute raises constitutional impli-
cations which will be considered in Part III.
This Note compares the damage caps enacted in these three
states, exposing their weaknesses and analyzing their strengths.
The purpose of the Note is to fashion from this comparison a new
proposal - one that avoids the earlier attempts' failures, mini-
mizes constitutional infirmities and strings together the effective
provisions into a damage cap that is effective without being too
burdensome for the victims. Whereas earlier enactments have bur-
dened the victims too much or too little, Part IV of this Note
attempts to find a proper balance between effectiveness, fairness,
desirability and constitutionality that is just right.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Is There A Crisis?
Before launching into a comparison and synthesis of the vari-
ous legislative attempts at capping malpractice damage awards, a
few preliminary items must be considered. One must remember
that these reform measures are a response to what has been called
the "medical malpractice crisis." 6 The first consideration, then, is
whether there exists a crisis necessitating the enactment of reform
measures. On this point, there is much debate, and countless theo-
ries exist either to discount or to support the existence of a crisis.7
One theory suggests that the insurance industry contrived the cri-
sis as a "marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (1988).
6. This term refers to problems of availability and/or affordability of malpractice
insurance. Note, The Applicability of Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 255, 255 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Experience Rating];
see also Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399,
399 (1987) (no single theory can explain the causes behind the recent liability insurance
crisis). This Note focuses primarily on the issue of affordability, which is central to the
present debate concerning whether "the extensive mobilization of resources and implemen-
tation of reforms" can be justified. Note, Experience Rating, supra, at 259. The cost of
malpractice insurance discourages doctors from practicing in high risk practices and in
rural geographic areas inhabited chiefly by poorer clientele. See infra text accompanying
note 56.
For a brief description of the history of the medical malpractice crisis, see Qual, A
Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420-21
(1986).
7. See Qual, supra note 6, at 422 n.22.
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of established [victims'] rights, and the acquisition and legitima-
tion of new privileges."' 8 A related theory asserts that insurance
companies manipulated the market to create a crisis atmosphere
that would eliminate competition among themselves.'
However, there is support for the theory that a genuine mal-
practice crisis exists and that the malpractice insurance industry is
in need of reform. One commentator suggested that premiums in-
creased dramatically because a number of legal developments10
damaged the insurers' confidence in their ability to predict future
liabilities.11 Another theory points to the distinct incentives in the
American tort system for injured parties to litigate their claims.1 2
These developments forced the insurance companies to add on an
"unpredictability risk premium.' 13
The available statistical data also indicate the existence of a
"crisis" situation. For example, one source reported that the aver-
age medical malpractice award, which was $404,726.00 in 1980,
8. Note, Legislative Limitations on Medical Malpractice Damages: The Chances
of Survival, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1583, 1603 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Legislative Limita-
tions] (quoting Berweig, Foreward to T. LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSUR-
ANCE at xi (1978)).
9. See Qual, supra note 6, at 422. Proponents of these related theories point to the
fact that the insurance industry is essentially exempt from federal antitrust laws and can
therefore avoid price competition and raise rates above competitive levels. Abraham, supra
note 6, at 401.
10. These developments include: retroactive strict liability for product defects that
were unknown at the time that a warning could have been given, an increased scope of
joint and several liability among tortfeasors, and the awarding of non-economic damages to
victims exposed to danger prior to any signs of physical harm. Abraham, supra note 6, at
406-07.
11.
Because many of the expansions of tort liability . . . were not anticipated by
insurers, they have become wary of their ability to predict future expansion. The
role played by this kind of wariness should be emphasized, even though it cannot
be documented statistically and sometimes seems unwarranted. Insurance under-
writers have become highly distrustful of courts and juries. This distrust can
often obscure relevant distinctions between states with narrow and those with
liberal rules of recovery, and between standards adopted by obscure trial courts
and those endorsed at the appellate level. There is little, aside from several years
without major legal surprises, that is likely to neutralize this wariness.
Id. at 406.
12. Id. at 409. The theory points to three features of the American tort system that
create distinctive incentives to litigate: the availability of contingent fees for plaintiffs' at-
torneys, the "American rule" that a losing party is not obligated to pay his adversary's
costs, and the absence of the widespread, generous forms of social insurance prevalent in
other Western democracies. Id.
13. Id. at 405.
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had risen to $1,478,028.00 by 1986.14 Another source revealed
that the cost of medical malpractice premiums increased over the
previous year's costs by 55.2 percent in 1985 and by 29 percent in
1986.15 The recoveries drive up the premiums,16 and, it seems safe
to conclude that, the premiums increase the costs of medical prac-
tices, especially those that involve the most risk. 17
Since this Note is about the desirability and feasibility of
damage caps, a final determination about the existence of a crisis
is outside its scope. Therefore, this Note assumes that legislatures
discovered sufficient evidence of a crisis to warrant adoption of
reform measures.
B. The Response of the Legislatures
Legislatures have responded to the malpractice crisis in sev-
eral ways. 8 Wisconsin, for example, has mandated the use of pre-
trial screening panels to eliminate non-meritorious claims.19 Evi-
dentiary and procedural requirements, such as the collateral
source rule,20 and the qualification of expert witnesses21 have been
modified. Also, in order to shift the costs and burdens of litigation,
restrictions have been placed on the award of attorney's fees. 2
14. Note, Experience Rating, supra note 6, at 260 n.37. In 1980, the verdicts in
medical malpractice cases ranged from $1,708 to nearly $6.7 million. By 1986, the awards
ranged from $2,500 to almost $16 million. Id.
15. Mooney, The Liability Crisis - A Perspective, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1235, 1242
(1987).
16. See generally id. at 1241-44 (arguing that the liability insurance crisis, consist-
ing of increases in the price of premiums and decreases in the availability of commercial
liability insurance, is caused largely by the expansion of tort law).
17. It seems, then, that the consequences of this crisis might extend beyond the
alarming increase in medical malpractice premiums and the resulting increase in medical
costs to consumers: assuming that doctors act at least in part as rational economic beings,
in order to avoid risk, and to increase profits, doctors will tend to abandon high risk, and
thus more costly, practices. Such practices are still, nevertheless, a necessary part of the
nation's health care system. Therefore, increases in insurance premiums arguably cause a
crisis in the medical industry as well. Moreover, a risk-averse medical profession could slow
the advance of the medical sciences and stunt innovation.
Additionally, the crisis, in terms of the availability and affordability of liability insur-
ance, is inhibiting the provision of medical services in rural areas. See infra text accompa-
nying note 56.
18. For a detailed description of numerous tort reform measures adopted by legisla-
tures, see Qual, supra note 6, at 427-38.
19. Id. at 430 n.56.
20. Id. at 433-34.
21. Id. at 436-37.
22. Id. at 432-33.
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The reform strategy under focus here though, is the imposi-
tion of limits, or caps, on the amount of damages awarded. Al-
though this is a common solution, significant differences exist in
the particular forms the caps take. Predictably, the legislatures
have adopted different dollar levels at which the caps take effect.23
Besides those obvious differences, other significant differences
can be found. This Note considers which damage cap provisions
are more or less effective while assuming that damage caps in
general are an effective means of addressing the malpractice in-
surance crisis. The widespread use of this particular reform mea-
sure indicates that legislatures believe damage caps will be effec-
tive. Statistical evidence indicates that this faith has not been
misplaced. One study indicated that "the average impact of stat-
utes [limiting] all or part of the plaintiff's recovery has been to
reduce average severity by 23 %.-124 An independent statistical
analysis of the effectiveness of damage caps, however, is beyond
the scope of this Note. The comparison and synthesis done in this
piece assumes both that a crisis exists, and that damage caps are
an effective means of addressing the crisis.25
The final preliminary consideration concerns a determination
of what kinds of damages should be capped. For instance, some
statutes limit total medical malpractice liability26 while others
limit only noneconomic damages.2 7 "Because so many courts con-
23. Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984) ($200,000 limit on
total liability) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 1989) ($1,000,000 damage
limitation on total noneconomic damages).
24. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 416 (1987).
25. See An Update on the Liability Crisis: Tort Policy Working Group, 10 Am. J.
TRIAL ADVOc. 213, 243 (1986) [hereinafter An Update on the Liability Crisis] (arguing
that a properly formulated damage cap will expedite settlements, reduce the costs of the
tort system and eliminate a lack of uniformity in awards for similar injuries).
26. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (West Supp. 1989) (total recovery for
injury or death in a medical malpractice case is limited to $500,000; for acts of malpractice
after January 1, 1990, the limit is $750,000).
27. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West Supp. 1989) (total recovery for
noneconomic damages for bodily injury or death is limited to $1,000,000 for actions filed
after June, 1986, with adjustments made to reflect changes in the consumer price index for
urban consumers); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (1988) (total recovery for
noneconomic damages for personal injury or death limited to an amount "determined by
multiplying .043 by the average annual wage and by the life expectancy of the" victim).
The Washington statute was declared unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court
in Sofle v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989), which is discussed in
more detail infra, notes 163-75 and accompanying text. A comparison of noneconomic
damages and economic damages is made infra, notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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sidered it harsh that a seriously injured patient may not recover
his total economic losses [it has been suggested that] only a cap
on noneconomic damages should be sought." '28 Hospital bills, doc-
tors' fees, medication fees and rehabilitation costs provide an ob-
jective means to measuring economic damages. Some consider
these losses to be "the most basic building block in the remedial
process. ' 29
Noneconomic damages, on the other hand, are not measured
by an objective standard.3 0 Although plaintiff's attorneys try to
make the determination as objective as possible, these losses are
not readily quantifiable in pecuniary terms. 3 When compared
with economic damages, noneconomic damages remain speculative
in nature and susceptible to manipulation by juries motivated to
overcompensate a sympathetic plaintiff. Consequently,
noneconomic damages are the most likely target for the imposition
of a cap. 2
Although some consider capping noneconomic damages as
more favorable than capping economic damages, it is important to
remember that noneconomic damages are as genuine as economic
damages.3 3 As stated in one authority, given that there is "good
reason for legal redress against another because of the way in
which an injury occurred, the legal system falls short of its mis-
sion of doing justice if it redresses only economic harm. ' 4 Coin-
ciding with the authenticity of noneconomic damages is the fact
that noneconomic damage awards maintain great value as a
28. Comment, Medical Malpractice: Constitutional Implications of a Cap on Dam-
ages, 7 N. ILL. UL. REV. 61, 85 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional Implica-
tions] (footnote omitted) (discussing the concern that a limit may prevent an injured per-
son from recovering even his or her medical expenses).
29. Note, A Proposal to Cap Tort Liability: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Heightened
Rationality, 20 J.L. REFORM 1215, 1233 (1987) [hereinafter Note, A Proposal to Cap].
30. See Wade, An Evaluation of the "Insurance Crisis" and Existing Tort Law, 24
Hous. L. REV. 81, 88 (1987) (pain and suffering and emotional distress are similar to
punitive damages in that no objective standard exists for setting the amount of the award).
31. Id. Historically, western society has attempted "to convert all our inquiries into
money. It would be nice if we could find some other way of taking care of pain and emo-
tional distress, but we have not found it yet." Id.
32. Note, Future Trends, supra note 2, at 1671.
33. Note, Medical Malpractice - $250,000 Cap on Pain and Suffering Cal. Civ.
Code § 333.2 - Does the Statute Meet its Constitutional Burden and Legislative Goals? 8
WHITTIER L. REV. 601, 605 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Medical Malpractice].
34. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 358 (2d printing 1965).
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source of compensation for an affront to one's dignity.35 They en-
sure placement of responsibility upon a wrongdoer 8 and provide a
source for attorneys fees.3 7
Given the authenticity and value of such awards, limiting
them must be done with care. The administrative difficulty in de-
termining the proper limit is a weak excuse for foregoing the ef-
fort.38 What follows is an examination of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the attempts made by the states of Ohio, Wisconsin and
Washington to limit damages.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The following is a detailed analysis of three different versions
of a cap on noneconomic damages. Each provision will be evalu-
ated on its effectiveness in alleviating the crisis, as well as its fair-
ness and desirability to the insurance companies, the health care
providers and the victims of medical malpractice.
A. The Ohio Provision
The Ohio statute provides in pertinent part: "In no event
shall an amount recovered for general damages in any medical
claim ...not involving death exceed the sum of two hundred
thousand dollars."39 The provision's most obvious shortcoming is
the ambiguity of the term "general damages." This ambiguity has
given rise to a debate regarding the precise subject of the limita-
tion. Some distinguish between a statute limiting general damages
and one which limits noneconomic damages.40 Under this theory,
35. Id.
36. Id. at 359; see also Note, Medical Malpractice, supra note 33, at 605 ("a
wrongdoer should bear the cost for all the losses resulting from his negligence").
37. Note, Medical Malpractice, supra note 33, at 605.
38. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 34, at 359.
39. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984).
"Medical claim," as used in the limitation provision, is currently defined as "any claim
asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital. . . that arises out of
the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11
(Baldwin Supp. 1989). It also includes "derivative claims for relief that arise from the
medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person." Id.
40. See Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 28, 495 N.E.2d
51, 56 (C.P. 1985) (quoting 30 OHIO JUR. 3d Damages § 165 (1981)) (since Ohio's provi-
sion limiting general damages is aefined as limiting all damages "necessarily result[ing]
from the injury complained of," authority relating to noneconomic damage cap is inappli-
cable); see also Note, Future Trends, supra note 2, at 1653 (distinguishing statutes with a
general damage provision from statutes with a damage limitation that is purely
1989-90]
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a general damage limitation could conceivably include economic
as well as noneconomic losses.
Other sources, however, find the term "general damages" to
be synonymous with "noneconomic damages.""' This appears to
be a more tenable position. "The distinguishing characteristic of
general damages is the lack of corroboration - the lack of specific
evidence - of a specific monetary loss." '42 Since noneconomic dam-
ages also cover losses which cannot be objectively measured, such
as pain and suffering, and physical disability,43 the two terms
should be considered to be synonymous.
Although the term, "general damages," logically refers only
to noneconomic damages, the confusion among courts and others
remains. Because of the basic difficulty in determining which
damage figures are subject to the limitation, administration of the
cap is difficult. This ambiguity has created problems when the
courts have considered the validity of the cap.44 Such a problem
could be avoided if greater care is taken in drafting the statute to
define more clearly which losses are subject to limitation.
1. Effectiveness
As mentioned above, one theory used to explain the medical
malpractice crisis is the inability of the insurance industry to pre-
dict liabilities in the face of the liberalization of tort principles.45
noneconomic).
41. See Leatherberry, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Will the Poor Pay More
Again? 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 101, 106 n. 19 (1975) ("'[n]oneconomic loss' is another
frequently used . . . phrase" that is synonymous with general damages). Cf. R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14, at 149-50 (1977) (acknowledges that "[s]uch losses
. . . [may] have no pecuniary dimension," but objects to use of the phrase "noneconomic
losses" since there is true economic loss).
42. Leatherberry, supra note 41, at 105-06 n.19 (quoting W. ROKES, NO-FAuLT IN-
SURANCE 209 (1971)).
43. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
44. In Duren, for example, an Ohio court was confronted with a challenge to the
statute's validity. Because the Ohio provision limited "general damages," the court found
no relevance in the validation of a cap on "noneconomic damages" by the California Su-
preme Court in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). Duren, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 56. Instead, the
Duren court struck down the provision by applying the logic of the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court, which invalidated a noneconomic cap similar to the California provision: "It
is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care
industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore most in
need of compensation." Duren, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d at 28-29, 495 N.E. 2d at 56 (quoting
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980)).
45. See supra notes 10-11 & 13 and accompanying text.
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Insurance companies are forced to charge an "unpredictability
risk premium" in response.4 An evaluation of the validity of this
argument, however, is not possible "without psychoanalyzing
those responsible for the actuarial calculations that precede rate-
setting. 47
Assuming this theory is valid, Ohio's $200,000 limitation
should be very effective. The cap removes one unpredictable as-
pect of actuarial calculation by establishing the maximum liability
to which an insurance company could be subjected.48 However,
Ohio's cap is not as "absolute" as it could be. A single incident of
medical malpractice not only gives a cause of action to the victim,
but could also create derivative claims.49 The Ohio statute applies
a separate $200,000 limit to each claim.50 Rather than being able
to count on their exposure being limited to $200,000 for each inci-
dent of malpractice, the insurance companies must try to guess
how many derivative suits might be filed with a victim's claim.
Arguably, predictability could be enhanced further by adding to
the statutory cap a "per occurrence" provision, applying a single
limit to all the claims arising from that single incident.5' Although
Ohio does not have a "per occurrence" provision, the fact that
each devivative claim is limited to $200,000 aids predictability
more so than if the cap only applied to the victim's claim and
derivative claims were unlimited. 2 Restoration of predictability
should alleviate the need for a "risk premium," thereby reducing,
or at least curbing, increases in malpractice insurance premiums.53
46. Abraham, supra note 6, at 405.
47. Id. at 408.
48. See Commentary, Medical Malpractice: The Second Wave of "Reform", 37
ALA. L. REv. 419, 427 (1986).
49. For example, negligent injury to a husband could be grounds for a wife's loss of
consortium suit.
50. The Ohio statute limits "any medical claim" to the $200,000 limit. OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984) (emphasis added). A derivative claim is considered
a separate "medical claim" under Ohio law. See supra note 39.
51. See An Update on the Liability Crisis, supra note 25, at 244. For further discus-
sion of a "per occurrence" application of damage caps, see the discussion of the Wisconsin
statute, infra text accompanying notes 69-71, and the Washington statute, infra text ac-
companying notes 91-92 & 94-99.
52. But see An Update on the Liability Crisis, supra note 25, at 244 (arguing that
any cap without a "per occurrence" provision can be defeated by a victim's attorney en-
couraging as many family members as possible to file separate derivative suits).
53. See Commentary, supra note 48, at 427.
Industry-initiated alternatives, though outside the scope of this Note, provide another
option for addressing the crisis. Arguably, if the insurance companies are concerned about
predictability, they could impose policy limits. Health care providers, however, would still
1989-90]
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Even without the premium for unpredictability, increases in
the aggregate payout in malpractice cases also affect premiums.
Relative to a situation without damage limits, imposition of the
Ohio cap should reduce the total amount of payout because each
claim is limited to $200,000. Although derivative claims arising
from a single incident of malpractice are considered separately for
purposes of the Ohio cap, payout should still be reduced. 54 Assum-
ing that the resultant savings to the insurance companies would be
passed on to policyholders, a reduction in payout should reduce
premiums as well.
2. Fairness and Desirability
Insurance companies likely see caps as an effective means of
alleviating the crisis. Caps should make awards easier to predict
and simplify the actuarial calculation process. 55 The savings that
result from the decrease in total payouts may also benefit the
companies. At the very least, a $200,000 cap probably lessens the
"squeeze" insurers suffer as a result of paying exorbitant awards
while trying to maintain competitive and affordable premiums.
If rates were to stabilize or decline, health care providers
would likely also favor Ohio's $200,000 absolute cap. The stat-
ute's effect on rates carries several positive ramifications. If rates
decrease, for example, the individual provider's practice will be-
come more profitable. Lower, more stable rates enable providers
both to remain in particularly risky areas of practice and to con-
be subject to the same excessive verdicts and settlements, and would consequently be ex-
posed to personal liability for the amount a verdict exceeded their coverage. Providers
would therefore be faced with the difficult choice of practicing without sufficient insurance,
or abandoning an established practice to assume practice in a less risky medical area. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
Society in general would also suffer as a result. In many cases, victims would not have
an adequate source of compensation for their injuries should a defendant be insolvent. It is
also conceivable that availability of health care in the high-risk medical areas would de-
crease. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Industry-initiated policy limits might
solve the problem of skyrocketing insurance premiums, but at an unacceptable cost.
54. Even if a wife, for example, is successful in recovering directly for her injuries,
while at the same time her husband receives a derivative damage award, the insurance
company's total exposure is limited to only $400,000 under the Ohio statute. If there were
no limit, the insurance company's exposure from the wife's claim alone could easily amount
to more than $400,000, since the average award is nearly $1.5 million. See supra note 14
and accompanying text. Still, payout is not as reduced as it could be were a "per occur-
rence" provision added. See supra note 51.
55. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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tinue practicing in less populous, rural regions of the country."
For these reasons, a $200,000 cap on malpractice damage awards
should gain their support.
The Ohio scheme, though, does not adequately protect the
interests of the victims whose valid claims for damage awards
would be artificially limited to $200,000. Although proponents of
the caps justify the absolute cap by arguing that the vast majority
of claims fall below the limit and are not affected, 7 this argument
simply does not square with the facts in Ohio: Ohio's cap, as con-
strued by its courts58 is substantially below the average award.59
Moreover, over time, inflation will cause the cap to affect an in-
creasing number of victims. Even if the cap does curb damage
awards without affecting the claims of a majority of the victims of
malpractice, it must be solving the crisis at the expense of the
minority of victims who are the most seriously injured. It is con-
ceivable that the more seriously injured person often will have the
greater pain and suffering and psychological injury. 0 Since such
losses do not lend themselves to easy economic valuation, they are
just the kinds of losses that would be limited by a noneconomic
cap. In essence, this places the burden of supporting the health
care industry squarely upon the shoulders of those most in need of
compensation." These individuals deserve more protection than
the Ohio statute provides. The $200,000 maximum recovery is far
56. ABC World News Tonight: The American Agenda (ABC television broadcast,
January 12, 1989).
In its "American Agenda" segment, ABC News presented the plight of one doctor
practicing in a rural area of Montana. Because this doctor delivered babies, he had to pay
malpractice premiums of over $50,000 each year. With the "limited patient load" of a
"small town practice," and after paying these high premiums, the doctor was left with an
annual income of only $30,000. He could no longer afford the high rates, and was forced to
choose between dropping high risk practices or moving to a more urbanized area in Mon-
tana where he could maintain a larger patient load. He chose the latter. Id.
57. See Note, A Proposal to Cap, supra note 29, at 1239; see also Martin, Limiting
Damages for Pain and Suffering: Arguments Pro and Con, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 317,
337 (1986) (cap proponents argue that "only the most seriously-injured tort victims will be
denied full compensation for their pain and suffering if ceilings are imposed upon
noneconomic damages"); Note, Legislative Limitations, supra note 8, at 1603 ("some
courts have indicated that the vast majority of malpractice claims fall under the damage
limits set by various statutes").
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
60. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 34, at 46.
61. This point was noted in Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 942, 424 A.2d 825, 837
(1980); see also Martin, supra note 57, at 337 (the most seriously injured, who need larger
awards, will be the only individuals to be denied full compensation for pain and suffering).
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too low to ensure fair compensation to victims.
Compensation and insurability in the liability insurance con-
text are essentially two sides of the same coin.62 To solve the cri-
sis, then, the insurance industry, the health care providers and the
victims must share the burden. Under the Ohio provision, the vic-
tim is burdened too much.
B. The Wisconsin Provision
The Wisconsin provision provides: "The limit on total
noneconomic damages for each occurrence . . . shall be
$1,000,000 ...and shall be adjusted . ..to reflect changes in
the consumer price index." 3 The statute defines noneconomic
damages as "moneys intended to compensate for pain and suffer-
ing; humiliation . . . noneconomic effects of disability . . . loss of
consortium . . . or loss of love and affection." '64 The limit is appli-
cable to "each occurrence from all health care providers . . . who
are found negligent .. .for any action filed .. .before January
1, 1991. ''"5 If the malpractice action is before a jury, "the jury
shall make a finding as to noneconomic damages without regard
to the limit." 6 To facilitate the administration of the provision,
each damage award is to specify the amount of money awarded
for each category of damages, such as: pain and suffering, loss of
consortium, lost earnings, medical expenses, and "[o]ther eco-
nomic injuries and damages."67
62. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 411. Abraham suggests that new forms of com-
pensation need to be developed outside the existing tort system. Id. at 410-11. He argues
that a fundamental conflict exists between the risk-reducing and cost-spreading goals of the
modern tort system and the predictability of pay-outs that insurers rely upon to set liability
insurance rates. Consequently, absent alternative forms of compensation, he concludes that
some reasonable limits on tort liability are essential to combat the uncertainty that leads to
spiraling premium increases and reduced availability of liability insurance coverage. Id.
63. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West Supp. 1988).
64. Id. § 893.55(4)(a).
65. Id. § 893.55(4)(b).
66. Id. § 893.55(4)(c). If the jury finds that its initial determination of noneconomic
damages (made without regard to the cap on liability) exceeds the limit, "the jury shall
make any reduction required under []§ 895.045 and the court shall award as noneconomic
damages the lesser of the reduced amount or the limit." Id.
67. Id. § 893.55(5). The complete provision reads:
Every award of damages under ch. 655 shall specify the sum of money, if any,
awarded for each of the following for each claimant for the period from the date
of injury to the date of award and for the period after the date of the award,
without regard to the limit under sub. (4)(d):
(a) Pain, suffering and noneconomic effects of disability.
(b) Loss of consortium, society and companionship or loss of love and
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In two ways, this provision is superior to Ohio's: it expressly
limits noneconomic damages and it explicitly defines this term.
This makes it easier to administer than Ohio's "general damage"
limitation 8 because it is less confusing, and because the jury
award must specify the noneconomic elements.
1. Effectiveness
Because the measure limits damages "for each occurrence,"69
any claims of the victim's spouse, parents or children would ap-
pear to be aggregated with the victim's own claim into a single
$1,000,000 limit.70 The limit also represents the entire amount re-
coverable against all health care providers responsible for the
occurrence.
71
By treating all of the possible derivative claims as one with
the victim's, the "per occurrence" provision theoretically enhances
predictability more than an absolute cap without a "per occur-
rence" provision. The Ohio provision attempted to check the ram-
pant increase in derivative claims by subjecting each derivative
claim to a separate $200,000.72 Since the Ohio provision lacks a
"per occurrence" provision, victims could avoid the effect of the
cap by filing as many separate claims as possible.7 Each individ-
ual derivative claim would open the insurance company to addi-
tional liability of $200,000. The company would have no way to
predict whether a single incident of malpractice would lead to one
damage award of $200,000 or, for example, seven awards with a
total potential exposure of $1,400,000.
The Wisconsin "per occurrence" provision goes one step fur-
ther towards limiting derivative claims than its Ohio counterpart
it places all claims under a single limit. Consequently, the in-
affection.
(c) Loss of earnings or earning capacity.
(d) Each element of medical expenses.
(e) Other economic injuries and damages.
Id.
68. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
69. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
70. Saichek, A Summary of the New Statutes Governing Medical Malpractice, WIs.
BAR BULL., Oct. 1986, at 8, 10.
71. Id.
72. This conclusion follows from the fact that the term "medical claim" includes
derivative claims and that the statutory limit applies to any "medical claim." See supra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
73. See An Update on the Liability Crisis, supra note 25, at 244.
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surance company knows its maximum exposure for a single act of
malpractice is $1,000,000. This theoretically makes the "risk pre-
mium" even less necessary and should help stabilize premium
rates.
The total payout under Wisconsin's "per occurrence" provi-
sion could be less than under the Ohio provision. Although the
Ohio statute limits the victim's recovery to $200,000, the insur-
ance companies are exposed to possible liability for multiple
claims of $200,000 each. Given the unlikely situation that more
than five separate claims arise from a single incident of malprac-
tice, the absence of a per occurence provision would permit total
liability to exceed $1,000,000. In Wisconsin, however, companies
avoid such exposure because all claims fall under a single limit.
Maximum payout in Wisconsin, then, could theoretically be less
than that in Ohio, though this is unlikely.
Other aspects of the Wisconsin statute may stabilize mal-
practice insurance premiums as well. Jurors are required to estab-
lish the damage award without regard to the damage cap.74 Then
if the jury finds that noneconomic damages exceed the limit, it
must make the required reduction.7 5 This prevents the damage
limitations from being used by the jury as a floor instead of a
ceiling, and it avoids the increases in noneconomic damage awards
that might result from such a use.7 6 Total payout should be re-
duced as a result. The sunset provision 7 should encourage the in-
surance companies to stabilize rates: insurers must realize that in
order for the cap to be reenacted after January 1, 1991, rates
must stabilize or decrease.78 Assuming insurers and providers
favor the cap, they will work to end the rapid premium increases
in order to secure the reenactment of the damage cap statute.
Certain provisions in the Wisconsin statute are theoretically
effective; however, the cap itself is fatally flawed. The $1,000,000
limit is too high. Since most damage awards will fall beneath the
74. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(c) (West Supp. 1988).
75. See id.
76. See An Update on the Liability Crisis, supra note 25, at 244 (suggesting that
damage caps set too high might encourage juries to raise noneconomic damage awards in
individual cases and thus result in increases in overall damage awards).
77. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988). The subsection provides
that the damage cap applies only to those actions "filed on or after June 14, 1986 and
before January 1, 1991." Id. (emphasis added).
78. See Comment, Constitutional Implications, supra note 28, at 85.
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limit, the cap will affect too few cases. 9 As a result, there will be
little, if any, impact on predictability or payout. Even if insurers
would favor this provision, the high limit prevents them from do-
ing much to alleviate the crisis. However, the effectiveness of the
"per occurrence," jury, and sunset provisions found in the Wiscon-
sin statute merit their inclusion in a model statute.
2. Fairness and Desirability
Insurance companies would favor the "per occurrence," jury,
and sunset provisions in the Wisconsin statute because of the
favorable effects on predictability and payout. They would likely
not favor the particular Wisconsin limit of $1,000,000, however,
because it probably affects too few cases to be effective. The
$1,000,000 limit leaves a large range of potential awards, which
likely will do little to enhance predictability. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether the $1,000,000 limit can produce the savings
benefits from lower payouts. Because they are unlikely to receive
any significant relief from the crisis, insurance companies will not
likely favor the Wisconsin cap.
The health care industry in all probability will not favor the
Wisconsin provision. It seems unlikely that premiums will stabilize
or decline because of the limited impact such a high cap will have
on predictability and total payout.80 Without a decrease in premi-
ums, providers will continue to experience decreasing profits un-
less they continue to raise the price for medical care. Again, many
may be forced to leave particular practice areas or regions of the
country.81 Because these problems are solved by the Ohio provi-
sion, the health care providers would likely favor the Ohio provi-
sion over the one in Wisconsin.
While the provision is deficient in terms of effectiveness and
desirability among insurers and health care providers, it is gener-
ous in terms of fairness and desirability to victims. Contrary to
the Ohio cap, which remains stagnant, Wisconsin provides for an
annual adjustment to the limit to compensate for the effects of
inflation.8 As a result, future victims will not be subjected to a
lower cap in real dollar terms during inflationary periods.
Although the Wisconsin statute burdens only the victims who
79. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
80. See supra text accompanying note 79.
81. See supra text accompanying note 56.
82. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West Supp. 1989).
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are most likely to have been the most severely injured (those vic-
tims with awards above $1,000,000) the burden is not as egregious
as the burden imposed by the Ohio plan simply because the
$1,000,000 limit will not reduce as many awards as the $200,000
cap. In addition, any reduction will not be as drastic since the
award only has to be reduced to $1,000,000 instead of $200,000.
Victims make a much smaller sacrifice, but since the cap will be
ineffective in bringing about a more stable, workable insurance
system,83 the sacrifice is for naught. Like the Ohio statute, the
Wisconsin provision attempts to balance compensation and insura-
bility, but it fails to do so satisfactorily: the limit is simply too
high to have any significant impact. In contrast to the victims in
Ohio who bear too much of the burden, victims in Wisconsin sac-
rifice too little.
C. The Washington Provision
The Washington statute defines noneconomic damages as
"subjective, nonmonetary losses, including, but not limited to pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigure-
ment . . . emotional distress, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation, and de-
struction of the parent-child relationship."84
The operative provision of the damage limitation is con-
structed as follows:
In no action seeking damages for personal injury or death may a
claimant recover a judgment for noneconomic damages exceed-
ing an amount determined by multiplying 0.43 by the average
annual wage and by the life expectancy of the person incurring
noneconomic damages . . . . The limitation contained in this
subsection applies to all claims for noneconomic damages made
by a claimant who incurred bodily injury. Claims for loss of con-
sortium, loss of society and companionship, destruction of the
parent-child relationship, and all other derivative claims asserted
by persons who did not sustain bodily injury are to be included
within the limitation on claims for noneconomic damages arising
from the same bodily injury.85
The statute further provides that, "[i]f a case is tried to a jury,
83. See supra text accompanying note 79.
84. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250(l)(b) (1988).
85. Id. § 4.56.250(2).
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the jury shall not be informed of the limitation." 86
Like the Wisconsin provision, '87 the Washington statute ex-
pressly limits noneconomic damages and explicitly defines the
term. In this respect, then, this provision is superior to Ohio's
"general damages" provision because it is less confusing and eas-
ier to administer.88
1. Effectiveness
Some commentators concede that the Washington scale may
improve predictability.89 The legislature apparently had this goal
in mind,90 and some of the provisions serve this goal effectively.
Like its Wisconsin counterpart, the Washington statute includes a
"per occurrence" provision 9 ' which should enhance
predictability. 92
Gauging the limitation to the state average annual wage,93
however, has its drawbacks. Insurance companies, for example,
are in the business of predicting loss, but now must predict rising
incomes as well. Furthermore, the flexible nature of the sliding
scale (varying with average annual salary and life expectancy) in-
hibits companies from determining their maximum exposure. In
this regard, the $200,000 absolute cap is a much better measure
to enhance companies' ability to predict liability.
The effect of the scale on payout is mixed. On one hand, the
"per occurrence" provision is likely to reduce total payout.94 Also,
86. Id. § 4.56.250(3).
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
89. See Wiggins, Harnitiaux & Whaley, Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and
the State Consititution: Testing the Limits, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 193, 231 (1986-87) (arguing
that any cap may square with predictability, but regardless of the yardstick used, i.e., the
average annual wage or the Dow Jones average, cutting off a jury award does not square
with the state Constitution).
90. See Note, A Proposal to Cap, supra note 29, at 1219 (one stated goal of the
Washington Legislature was "to provide an objective standard by which insurance compa-
nies could predict potential risks with great accuracy when establishing their premium
rates").
91. See supra text accompanying note 85.
92. See generally supra text accompanying notes 71-73 (explaining how "per occur-
rence" provisions relate to predictability).
93. The average annual wage is "the quotient derived by dividing total remuneration
reported by all employers [in Washington] by the average number of workers reported for
all months . . . rounding the result to the next lower multiple of one dollar." WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 50.04.355 (1990).
94. See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (discussing ':per occurrence"
provision effects on total payouts).
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in certain cases, payout will be even less than a $200,000 absolute
limit.95 Furthermore, since juries are not informed of the damage
limitation,9" the cap will not create the "floor" effect discussed
earlier.97 On the other hand, the maximum possible payout for an
injury may still be too high to significantly affect the total payout
to which the companies are exposed. In 1985, the maximum dam-
age award that a person could receive was $569,513.57.8 This
problem dissipates, however, as life expectancy decreases. Perhaps
the major shortcoming with respect to payout is the fact that, by
tying the sliding scale to life expectancy, the provision assumes
that all claimants will experience lifelong suffering.9 By compen-
sating people who may never experience the amount of pain and
suffering provided for in the statute, Washington's plan increases
total payout unnecessarily and lessens the impact on premiums as
a result.
2. Fairness and Desirability
As with the Wisconsin approach, the insurance companies
will favor many of the provisions that make up the Washington
damage cap. They will not support, however, the particular sliding
scale provision. Determining what a limit will be is more difficult
under a scale provision than it would be under an absolute cap. °°
The scale provision does not simplify the actuarial calculation pro-
cess as much as would an absolute cap. Therefore, the necessity of
a risk premium remains. Since the provision unnecessarily pro-
vides for lifelong noneconomic damage awards to people whose
pain and suffering may not last that long,10 1 the insurers may ob-
ject to the superfluous exposure. Finally, since the sliding scale is
95. For example, in 1985 the average annual wage in Washington was $18,699. See
Development in the Law - The 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act, 23 WILLIAMET-rE L.
REv. 211, 217 n.8 (1987) [hereinafter Development in the Law]. A person with a life
expectancy of twenty years would be able to recover a maximum of $160,811.40 [(.43 X
18,699) X 20] in Washington as compared to a maximum of $200,000 in Ohio.
96. WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250(3) (1988).
97. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98. Development in the Law, supra note 95, at 217.
99. Id. at 219.
100. Under an absolute cap, the most important figure that insurance companies
need to predict is the number of claims. With this figure, and assuming a "per occurrence"
limitation, insurers need only multiply their prediction times the cap to determine the total
potential payout. Under Washington's provision, however, they must also factor in a pre-
diction of wage increases and the average life expectancies of the victims.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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not as effective as the absolute cap in improving predictability and
reducing total payout, insurers simply will prefer the absolute cap.
Given the limited effect the Washington statute will have on
premiums, health care providers will prefer an absolute cap like
Ohio's as well. Without the reduction in premiums, providers'
profits may be reduced. As a result, there will be less encourage-
ment for doctors to remain in particular regions of the country.
Premium rates to cover high risk procedures will dissuade practice
in these "higher risk" areas of practice. The Washington statute
may be a better alternative than no limit at all, but an absolute
cap such as Ohio's is even more favorable to the medical provider.
One positive aspect for victims in the Washington scheme is
that it provides for inflationary adjustments because the scale is
gauged to the state average annual wage.102 Unlike the Ohio stat-
ute, then, future victims of medical malpractice will not be sub-
jected to a damage cap that increasingly restricts the amount, in
real dollar terms, of damages to which the victim is entitled.
Since a sliding scale allows for some flexibility in awards, vic-
tims might prefer it to an absolute cap; however, the Washington
scale is not the most favorable way to achieve such flexibility. One
major shortcoming is its failure to differentiate between victims
with respect to the type of injury or the severity of suffering.0 3
For example, compare the effects the Washington provision would
have on two people, with equal life expectancies of twenty years,
who are injured from medical malpractice. The jury's award for a
person who loses a finger may easily exceed the $160,811.40 cap
imposed by the sliding scale.104 Since a person who lost sixty per-
cent of her breathing capacity would be subject to the same calcu-
lation with the exact same figures, she also would be limited to the
same recovery. Her quality of life, however, obviously would be
substantially worse than the victim who lost the finger.
While tying the scale to the average annual wage is not the
most equitable or the most desirable approach from the victim's
perspective, compared with a low absolute cap like the one used in
Ohio, the flexible standard is preferable. Incorporating a more
wisely constructed scale in a damage limitation could avoid the
downfalls of the overly restrictive absolute cap used in Ohio, and
the overly generous absolute cap used in Wisconsin, thereby strik-
102. See Development in the Law, supra note 95, at 219.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 95.
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ing the proper balance between compensation and insurability and
alleviating many of the problems posed by the crisis.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DAMAGE CAPS
A consideration of a damage cap's effectiveness in alleviating
the medical malpractice crisis and its fairness and desirability
among the affected parties is not the end of the legislative inquiry
when drafting a limitation statute. Because the enactment of dam-
age caps has raised both federal and state constitutional issues, a
legislature must also consider the constitutional implications.
A. Equal Protection Challenges
One prevalent challenge has been that damage caps violate
the concept of equal protection under the law."0 5 The fourteenth
amendment, in part, states "[n]o State shall. . . deny to any per-
son . . . the equal protection of the laws."'0 6 In interpreting this
provision, the courts apply various levels of scrutiny depending on
the nature of the legislation involved. Legislation that discrimi-
nates against suspect classes, such as race, receives strict scrutiny.
This test requires that the legislative scheme in question be "nec-
essary to promote a compelling governmental interest.' 10 7 The
courts apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to statutes which
classify according to gender 1 8 and alienage. 0 9 This standard re-
quires that the legislative classification "serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."" 0
The third level of scrutiny, rational basis, requires that a clas-
105. See generally Richards, Statutes Limiting Medical Malpractice Damages, 32
FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 247 (1982) (summarizing several equal protection challenges to
medical malpractice damage caps and concluding that challenges may be more strictly
scrutinized under state constitutions than under the Federal constitution); Note, A Propo-
sal to Cap, supra note 29, at 1216 (legislators' attempts to limit malpractice awards are
often declared violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 987 (D. Kan. 1985) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969)); see, e.g., Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down miscegenation statute preventing interracial
marriages).
108. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down statute which pro-
vided preferential treatment to male administrators of estates).
109. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that school-age illegal
aliens may not be charged a special fee to receive a public school education).
110. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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sification be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.111
Under this test, courts have demonstrated significant deference
both to the legislature's purpose in enacting the provision and to
its selection of a given alternative among a variety of means. 1 2
In recent cases involving socio-economic legislation, where
the Supreme Court of the United States has historically applied
rational basis scrutiny, the Court has appeared to alter the tradi-
tional rational basis scrutiny, applying a more stringent applica-
tion of the test.1 3 While there is a lack of openly acknowledged
criteria used by the Court in this heightened scrutiny test,1 4 sev-
eral considerations appear to be addressed. These include: (1)
whether there is a factual foundation for the policies offered in
support of the legislation;" 5 (2) whether there is a sufficiently tai-
lored fit between the legislative goals and the means chosen;"'
and (3) whether the ends rationally justify the means.1
The movement to a heightened rational basis level of scrutiny
apparently suggests the Court's realization that not every case in-
volving economic or social welfare legislation can be forced into
the traditional rational basis test without sacrificing fundamental
fairness. 18 Arguably, medical malpractice statutes necessitate this
heightened scrutiny. For example, in its application of the height-
ened rational basis scrutiny to a medical malpractice statute, the
court in Coburn v. Agustin" 9 noted that although the right to re-
cover for personal injuries is not fundamental, it is a significant
right.120 Consequently, the court stated that medical malpractice
S11. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3, at 1444 (2d ed. 1988) (cit-
ing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).
112. See id. § 16-2, at 1440 ("courts have traditionally exhibited extreme deference
to the legislative definition of 'the general good,' either out of judicial sympathy for the
difficulties of the legislative process, or out of a belief in judicial restraint" (footnote
omitted)).
113. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 988-89 (D. Kan. 1985) (citing City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) and Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985)); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 111, § 16-3, at 1444
(in numerous recent "rational basis" cases, the Court's inquiry has taken on a "more pene-
trating character").
114. L. TRIBE, supra note 111, § 16-3, at 1445.
115. Id. § 16-3, at 1444.
116. Id.
117. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 989 (D. Kan. 1985) (stating that the
Supreme Court has started to focus on the ends and the means of the legislation under a
rational basis level of scrutiny).
118. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 990.
119. 627 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kan. 1985).
120. Id. at 994.
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victims were entitled to heightened review because they were con-
sidered a "sensitive" class. 121
Against this background, the treatment of noneconomic med-
ical malpractice damage caps that have been challenged on equal
protection grounds has been mixed. In Fein v. Permanente Medi-
cal Group, 22 the California Supreme Court upheld a cap on
noneconomic damages of $250,000 against an equal protection
challenge, applying a minimum rationality standard. 23 In reach-
ing its decision, the court noted that the statute in no way limited
a victim's recovery of economic losses.' 24 Because the statute al-
lowed for a complete recovery of pecuniary losses, the court
agreed with the California Legislature that "it was in the public
interest to ... obtain some cost savings by limiting noneconomic
damages"' 25 since such damages are much more speculative in
121. Id. at 995. Several characteristics indicate the presence of a sensitive class: "a
group that has suffered a history of prejudice. . . or a group that has inadequate represen-
tation from significant socio-political barriers to interest group formation . . . or a classifi-
cation based on an inherent trait over which . . . members have no control, which trait is
the subject of the legislation." Id. at 994 (citations omitted). The court stated that mem-
bers of the "medical malpractice victim" class are "sensitive" because they cannot control
either the inception of a medical condition or the malpractice imposed upon them, and
because they often lack both the physical and 'financial means to challenge laws that limit
their rights. Id. at 994-95.
122. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 892 (1985).
123. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court noted that "the
Legislature clearly had a reasonable basis for drawing a distinction between economic and
noneconomic damages." Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr.,at 383.
125. Id. at 160, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court pointed out that
"in the absence of some cost reduction, medical malpractice plaintiffs might as a realistic
matter have difficulty'collecting damages for any of their damages." Id.
While some courts have struck down damage caps as an illegitimate means to control
the medical malpractice crisis, most court have recognized the goal of alleviating the crisis
as a legitimate purpose for legislative action. See, e.g., id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 679, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 382 ("policy determinations as to the need for, and the desirability of, the
enactment are for the Legislature" (quoting American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984))); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (Ind. 1980) ("we [the court] do not sit to judge
the wisdom or rightness of [the statute's] underlying policies"); Pendergast v. Nelson, 256
N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977) ("[T]here was an imminent danger that a drastic curtailment in
the availability of health care services could occur. . . . No one can question the Legisla-
ture's power to deal with the problem."); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 933, 424 A.2d
825, 831 (1980) ("[The court] will not independently examine the factual basis for the
legislative justification for the statute . . . . [C]ourts will not second-guess the legislature
as to the wisdom of or necessity for legislation."); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp.,
24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 28, 495 N.E.2d 51, 56 (C.P. 1985) ("various decisions which have
held damage limitations statutes in medical malpractice cases as unconstitutional initially
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nature."'
On the other hand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
struck down a $250,000 statutory cap on damages for malpractice
victims. 127 The court first recognized that the ability to recover for
personal injury is "an important substantive right."128 The court
then proceeded to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny,129 even
though the Supreme Court of the United States had restricted ap-
plication of the intermediate test to classifications such as gender.
The court stated that "it is not confined to federal constitutional
standards and [is] free to grant individuals more rights that [sic]
the Federal Constitution requires."'130
The Coburn analysis exacts a wiser, more equitable approach
and, compared to Fein or Carson, is arguably a more appropriate
way to analyze damage caps. The Fein decision is not rigorous
enough, providing victims of medical malpractice insufficient pro-
tection of their rights to equal protection of the laws. The Carson
decision, on the other hand, is too rigorous and affords these vic-
tims too little protection. Perhaps if the New Hampshire Supreme
Court had the benefit of having the Coburn decision to refer to, it
may have realized that it could reach the same result by applying
Coburn's heightened rationality standard, thereby eliminating the
need for using intermediate level scrutiny.
It is clear that drafters of caps must consider both federal
and state constitution equal protection clauses. Assuming the state
courts do not apply a constitutional analysis that is different from
the federal analysis, a properly designed malpractice damage cap
that limits only noneconomic awards should be able to avoid con-
stitutional infirmities based on the equal protection clause. If the
courts recognize the existence of a crisis and the need for reform,
they should also recognize that this type of reform must necessa-
rily deny full recovery to some.'$' The more seriously injured vic-
recognize this type of legislation as being a proper subject for legislative action").
126. See generally Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 159, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
383-84 (noting that legal scholars have long questioned the awarding of damages for pain
and suffering, given the difficulties in placing monetary values on those types of losses).
127. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 941, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (1980).
128. Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830.
129. The court noted that the statutory classification "must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation." Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831 (emphasis in original) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Mal-
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tims forfeit some of their noneconomic damages to preserve com-
pensation for the rest of the victims and to ensure the continued
availability of medical care.
An analysis of the Ohio, Wisconsin, and Washington statutes
provides insight into how a damage cap should be designed to hur-
dle equal protection barriers. Ohio courts are sharply divided over
the constitutionality of the $200,000 cap.' s2 The most recent deci-
sion, Duren v Suburban Community Hospital,'3 3 invalidated the
measure. Duren involved a woman who was "uniquely dependent"
upon her husband because of a birth defect."3 4 He died while be-
ing treated at the hospital, and she brought an action for medical
malpractice.3 5 Mrs., Duren's survivorship claim resulted in a judg-
ment against the hospital of $1,000,000 for pain and suffering,
and $2,554 for funeral expenses.'3 6
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Cuyahoga County re-
fused to apply the $200,000 cap, declaring it violative of state and
federal constitutional provisions. By concentrating on the classifi-
cation scheme of the legislation, the court appeared to base its
decision on equal protection grounds. It cited Carson v Maurer137
as the best statement of the basis for invalidating the cap: "It is
simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of support-
ing the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are
most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensa-
tion."" 8 The court further attacked the legislative scheme calling
practice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1419 [hereinafter Comment, State Legislative
Responses].
132. See generally Duren v. Suburban Community Hospital, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25,
27, 495 N.E.2d 51, 55 (C.P. 1985) (listing conflicting authority in Ohio and in other
states).
133. 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 495 N.E.2d 51 (C.P. 1985).
134. Id. at 26, 495 N.E.2d at 54.
135. See id. at 27, 495 N.E.2d at 54-55. The facts of the Duren case are as follows.
The death occurred after Mr. Duren was admitted to the defendant hospital with com-
plaints of nausea, stomach pains, and vomiting. The admitting physician ordered several
tests. However, the results of one test were not available until after Duren's death; another
test was never performed. The physician ordered the administration of insulin as a result of
a third test, but none was administered. Although Duren was in great pain and in critical
condition, the hospital staff virtually ignored him. Although the doctor had been called two
hours earlier, and was nearby, he did not arrive until minutes before Mr. Duren died. See
id. at 26-27, 495 N.E.2d at 54.
136. Id. at 25, 495 N.E.2d at 53.
137. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
138. Duren, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d at 28-29, 495 N.E.2d at 56 (quoting Carson, 120
N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837).
TALE OF THREE DAMAGE CAPS
it, "shocking to this court's conscience"' 39 to shift responsibility
for loss from a more affluent segment of society to a group of
terribly injured individuals who are least able to bear the
burden.140
The level of scrutiny applied by the court to the damage
limit's classification scheme is difficult to determine. Although it
embraced the Carson rationale, the court failed to apply an inter-
mediate scrutiny: it failed to address whether the' classification
was substantially related to the achievement of an important gov-
ernmental objective.1 41 The court did not deferentially validate the
classification; instead it scrutinized the legislative scheme and la-
belled it "inconceivable" and "shocking.' 42 In addition to scruti-
nizing the means, the court also considered the propriety of the
legislative goals.' 43 This indicates the absence of intermediate
scrutiny and the application of a heightened rationality standard
consistent with the principles in Coburn. 44
There has been no equal protection challenge to the Wiscon-
sin provision; however, the Wisconsin cap would probably be vali-
dated under a heightened rationality standard. Its goal of alleviat-
ing the malpractice crisis is a permissible one.' 45 Moreover, a
$1,000,000 cap seems to be a more rational means to achieve this
goal: although it may be argued that the cap unduly burdens the
most seriously injured victims, compared to a $200,000 cap,
$1,000,000 goes much further towards compensating injuries. Be-
cause victims are more fairly compensated under the higher cap,
the means chosen have a closer relationship to the goal of alleviat-
ing the malpractice crisis.
It is unclear whether Washington's sliding scale provision of-
fends equal protection principles. 46 Under the heightened ration-
139. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 56.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 28-29, 495 N.E.2d at 56.
142. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 56.
143. Id. ("various decisions which have held damage limitation statutes in medical
malpractice cases as unconstitutional initially recognize this type of legislation as being a
proper subject for legislative action").
144. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 125.
146. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the provision and a conclusion that
the statute poses no genuine equal protection problem, see Development in the Law, supra
note 95, at 233. For the opposing view that the statute is violative of equal protection, see
Wiggins, Harnitiaux & Whaley, supra note 89, at 232-35 (arguing that the ceiling for non
economic damages violates the Washington constitution's privileges or immunities provi-
sion); see also Talmadge & Neugebauer, A Survey of Washington Medical Malpractice
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ality analysis of Coburn, the purpose of the act would be legiti-
mate. 147 Determining whether the means are appropriate,
however, is difficult because of the unique scale. At least one court
has found it "shocking" to the conscience that legislators are shift-
ing the burden of malpractice liability from the relatively affluent
members of the medical profession to the most severly injured vic-
tims of medical malpractice. 48 A sliding scale is less arbitrary
than an absolute cap because it allows a range of possible awards.
Because there are some circumstances under which Washington's
sliding scale will impose on the severely injured victims less of a
burden than that which would follow from an absolute cap,149 it
might be less shocking to a court's conscience. In theory, the slid-
ing scale is an attractive alternative to absolute caps, but the par-
ticular scale adopted by Washington is questionable.
The Washington provision gauges the scale to the average an-
nual wage.150 In some cases the most severely injured are compar-
atively less burdened than under a cap such as Ohio's. 151 At sev-
eral points along the scale, however, the severely injured are
burdened a great deal more. 2
While the constitutionality of Washington's statute remains
questionable, the provision's sliding scale concept is noteworthy. If
the scale related more directly to the amount of noneconomic
damages incurred and allocated the burden more wisely, there
would be a better fit between legislative goals and means, and
there would be a better chance that the sliding-scale limitation
would survive a constitutional challenge based on the equal pro-
Law, 23 GONz. L. REV. 267, 303 n. 158 (1987-88) (stating that the limitation was invali-
dated on equal protection grounds in an unreported case).
147. See supra note 125.
The historical note to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.160 (1988) provides the pream-
ble to chapter 305, which states that "it is the intent of the legislature to reduce costs
associated with the tort system, while assuring that adequate and appropriate compensation
for persons injured through the fault of others is available." Id. § 4.16.160 historical note.
148. Duren, 24 Ohio Misc. 2d at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 56.
149. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 85 & 93 and accompanying text.
151. In Ohio, the cap on damages is uniformly $200,000. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.43 (Baldwin 1984). Whenever a Washington plaintiff would receive more than
$200,000 under the sliding scale cap, they are less burdened.
152. For example, a person with a life expectancy of twenty years would be able to
recover a maximum $200,000 in Ohio, but the maximum noneconomic damages that could
be recovered under Washington's sliding scale is $160,811.40 [(.43 x 20) x 18,699]. If
other damages were low (i.e., less than $39,188.60), a person would be limited to a recov-
ery of less than $200,000 simply because she does not have a long life expectancy.
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tection clause.
B. Right to Trial by Jury Challenges
In addition to equal protection scrutiny, opponents of damage
caps have raised the issue of a person's right to a jury trial. 153
These challenges, however, are inconsistent with recent interpreta-
tions of the jury trial provision of the seventh amendment. In Tull
v. United States,15 4 the Supreme Court of the United States al-
luded to this issue when it stated, "[n]othing in the Amendment's
language suggests that the right to a jury trial extends to the rem-
edy phase of a civil trial."'55 Other federal courts have found this
reasoning instructive in dismissing seventh amendment jury trial
challenges to damage caps.' 56
Several arguments support the conclusions of these-courts.
The first involves consideration of the proper role of the jury. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[I]t is the role of the jury as factfinder to determine the extent
of a plaintiff's injuries. . . . [I]t is not the role of the jury to
determine the legal consequences of its factual findings. [This] is
a matter for the legislature .. . . [O]nce the jury has made
findings of fact with respect to damages; it has fulfilled its con-
stitutional function; it may not also mandate compensation as a
matter of law. 37
Damage caps do not violate the right to trial by jury because the
jury's function ends before the damage cap is imposed: this is con-
sistent with the principle that "a legislature may completely abol-
ish a cause of action without violating the right to trial by
153. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that Vir-
ginia's statutory cap on recovery in medical malpractice action did not violate the right of
jury trial under the seventh amendment); see also Note, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There
Substance To The Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 737, 738-39 (1989) (noting
that the Amicus Curiae Committee of The Asso6iation of Trial Lawyers of America in-
tends to challenge damage caps on federal and state jury 'trial grounds).
154. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
155. Id. at 426 n.9. Tull, which involved a question about the assessment of a civil
penalty under the Clean Water Act, did not deal directly with the right to jury trial. Foot-
note nine of the opinion, however, has been cited in subsequent cases which involve the
determination of damages. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196 n.5 (citing Tull in upholding Virginia's cap
on recovery); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1334 (D. Md. 1989)
(noting that Tull supports the proposition that legislatures may "limit recoverable damages
without offending the seventh amendment").
157. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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jury." '158 With this power, a legislature may also limit the dam-
ages which may be recoverable for a certain cause of action.1 59
Similarly, damage caps do not violate the seventh amendment be-
cause the existence of a remedy is a matter of law and not fact.160
Therefore, a damage cap merely sets the outer limits of a remedy
provided by a legislature. 61
The history behind the seventh amendment gives further sup-
port to the argument that damage caps do not abridge the right to
a jury trial. Civil juries were provided for in the seventh amend-
ment to protect "against the abuse of judicial, as distinct from
legislative, power. '"162 Since damage caps are enacted by legisla-
tures, abuse of judicial power is not at issue and seventh amend-
ment protections are unnecessary.
Given the analyses contained in the latest jury trial cases,
damage caps will most likely clear the seventh amendment hurdle;
however, these statutes have been, and may continue to be, chal-
lenged on the basis of similar jury trial provisions contained in
state constitutions. For example, in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp, 6'
the Washington Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the
Washington damage cap violated the jury trial provision of the
state constitution. The court based its decision on purely state
grounds: using an historical analysis, it found that juries in Wash-
ington had consistently been looked to for the determination of
damages.1 64
While each state's constitution may offer varying amounts of
protection for cap victims, the Sofie decision is flawed for many of
the same reasons that the seventh amendment does not bar the
use of damage caps. In the first place, by extending the jury's pur-
view beyond its fact-finding mission, the Sofie definition of the
jury's role is inconsistent with many other decisions. For example,
in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,6 5 the Virginia Su-
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.
1989) ("power of the legislature to define, augment, or even abolish complete causes of
action must necessarily include the power to define by statute what damages may be recov-
ered by a litigant with a particular cause of action").
160. Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376
S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (Virginia Supreme Court upheld a $750,000 damage cap)).
161. Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1333.
162. Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1164 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original).
163. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
164. Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 718-719.
165. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
[Vol. 40:825
TALE OF THREE DAMAGE CAPS
preme Court found that "the jury's fact-finding function extends
to the assessment of damages. Once the jury has ascertained the
facts and assessed the damages, however, the constitutional man-
date is satisfied. Thereafter, it is the duty of the court to apply the
law to the facts."166 The court further reasoned that since a dam-
age remedy is a legal matter, rather than a factual one, there is
"no right to have a jury dictate, through an award, the legal con-
sequences of its assessment." 6"
Sofie is weakened by additional flaws. It ignored a basic fact
about legislative power. Because legislatures have the power to
amend or abolish common law causes of action, it seems only logi-
cal that they have the ability to limit or abolish recoveries."6 8
Sofie frustrates the legislative purpose of the cap, which is to solve
the medical malpractice crisis, without finding any support in
reason.
An additional flaw is the Sofie court's mistaken interpretation
of authority. It relied on the district court's opinion in Boyd v.
Bulala,16 9 following the opinion as support for ignoring the Su-
preme Court of the United States' direction in Tull."'0 The Boyd
opinion, however, was reversed by the fourth circuit, which noted
Tull in passing.1 71 Also, the Sofie court found it "highly persua-
sive"172 that courts in Kansas, Texas, Ohio, and Florida have held
that damage caps to be violative of the right to jury trial, espe-
cially since "the operative language of the right to jury trial provi-
sions in those states' constitutions is nearly identical to our
own."17 3 The support which the Sofie court finds in this authority
is waning. A Kansas court has since upheld a damage limit in a
personal injury action against a challenge based on the right to a
166. Id. at 529 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 529; see also Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 684, 771 P.2d at 736 (Dolliver, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the majority . . . [failed] to distinguish between the damages a
jury finds and the judgment which the court grants").
168. See Note, The Constitutional Attack on Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap:
Equal Protection and the Right to Jury Trial, 22 U. RICH. L. REV., 95, 117 (1987) (Vir-
ginia General Assembly has the power to establish damage limits because it has the power
to amend or abolish causes of action); see also Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 686, 771 P.2d at
737 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (arguing that the power to abolish causes of action includes
the power to limit recoveries).
169. 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va 1987) (reaffirming a previous holding that a Vir-
ginia damage limit violated the seventh amendment), rev'd, Boyd, 877 F.2d 1191.
170. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 663, 771 P.2d at 725.
171. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196.
172. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 658, 771 P.2d at 723.
173. Id.
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jury trial. 174 The Sofie majority also ignored the fact that the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland upheld
a damage cap against a jury trial provision that was almost identi-
cal to the Washington constitutional provision. 75
Given the above discussion, the analysis contained in Ether-
idge, Boyd and Franklin, is more persuasive than the analysis pro-
vided by the court in Sofie. Although each individual state has the
power to grant its citizens greater constitutional rights than pro-
vided in the federal constitution, an extension of the right to jury
trial in this circumstance should be discouraged.
The reasons to discourage such extension may be reduced to
a simple comparison of the marginal benefits that society reaps
from a damage limitation with the benefits derived from defining
a right to jury to include the right to have a jury establish the
amount of damages to be awarded in a given case. Damage caps
can insure the availability of resources to compensate malpractice
victims by decreasing compensation to nonmeritorious - although
sympathetic - claims. To the extent that damage caps reduce
malpractice insurance premiums, or make liability insurance more
readily available, society will benefit from increased availability of
health care services in high risk practices and rural communi-
ties. 76 Clearly, benefits emanating from effective and fair damage
caps pervade society as a whole, including patients, health care
providers and the insurers. The expansion of the right to a jury
trial in this type of case simply cannot match the damage cap in
terms of societal benefit.
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL
Having analyzed the effectiveness, fairness and desirability
and the constitutional implications of the Ohio, Wisconsin and
Washington statutes, it is possible to formulate a statute that
combines the best features of each approach, is effective, does not
violate constitutional requirements, and 'fairly allocates the burden
174. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., 244 Kan. 726, 771 P.2d 71 (1989).
175. In Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989), decided
nearly three months before Sofie, the court held that a damage cap did not violate that
portion of Maryland's Constitution that provided that the right to a jury trial "shall be
inviolably preserved." Id. at 1335 (quoting MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 23). The
Sofie decision rested on the court's construction of a provision providing that "[t]he right
to trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 644,
771 P.2d 711, 716 (1989) (quoting WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21).
176. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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of reforming the malpractice insurance crisis.
A. Preliminary Considerations
For the purpose of drafting the new proposal, it is assumed
that strong factual support has been gathered to evidence a crisis
in a particular state.17 7 With that assumption in mind, an addi-
tional reform option must be mentioned, namely, the adoption of
no-fault liability. The drafter can choose between modifying the
existing liability system by adding a damage cap that applies only
in medical malpractice cases or adopting no-fault liability as a
new system. Since this Note compares various approaches to the
damage cap reforms, a consideration of the pros and cons of mak-
ing a wholesale change to a no-fault system of liability is beyond
its scope. Consequently, for the purposes of the legislative proposal
which follows, it is assumed that the medical malpractice crisis
can be, and should be, addressed with an amendment to, rather
than an abandonment of, the fault system.17 1
177. See Comment, Constitutional Implications, supra note 28, at 82 (establishing
strong evidence of a medical malpractice crisis is thought to be significant in assuring the
constitutional validity of the cap).
178. Recently, there has been an accelerated movement in the tort system toward the
adoption of no-fault liability. See TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 30 (1986). In the med-
ical malpractice area, for example, some advocate the adoption of a no-fault plan similar to
the worker's compensation system in exchange for limits on noneconomic damages. Com-
ment, Constitutional Implications, supra note 28, at 86 and n.141. Such an exchange
would be consistent with the quid pro quo doctrine, which requires that legislatures insti-
tute a just substitute when they abrogate a common law right. Id. at 75.
Some government agencies advocate a return to the traditional fault basis for liability.
See generally TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra (working group consisting of repre-
sentatives from ten federal agencies and the White House recommending return to fault-
based liability as one reform that will lead to the alleviation of the crisis in the availability
and affordability of liability insurance). The Tort Policy Working Group argues that the
trend towards no-fault liability is undermining traditional tort principles: "The long-term
effect of this development has been less to promote a more efficient or sensible tort system,
than to undermine the importance of fault." Id. at 31.
In light of this debate, it seems that the fault system should remain for two reasons.
First, if the no-fault approach fails to promote greater efficiency in the final analysis, there
is no reason to adopt it. The Tort Policy Working Group recognized that risk spreading for
all injuries through a no-fault tort system would be anti-consumer, since consumers would
ultimately pay the higher costs caused by inefficiencies: "[B]ecause of the extraordinarily
high transaction costs of the tort system, such compulsory insurance through the tort sys-
tem would be among the most inefficient and costly ways for consumers to purchase insur-
ance . . . . [Flor every $1 of compensation, the tort system requires the consumer to pay
approximately $3 in premiums." Id. at 31 n.24. Indeed, many feel that the fault system is
not untenable. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 34, at 220.
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In addition, this proposal assumes, as concluded above, that a
cap is likely to be effective in alleviating the crisis,17 and, if lim-
ited to noneconomic damages, an appropriate mode of reform.1 80
B. Statutory Provisions
Upon consideration of the attributes and shortcomings of the
reform measures in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Washington, the follow-
ing proposal is suggested to alleviate the malpractice crisis in an
effective yet equitable manner:
§ 100: Limitation of noneconomic damages in medical malprac-
tice actions.
(1) "Noneconomic damages" as used in this section means non-
pecuniary, subjective losses including, but not limited to pain,
suffering, disability or disfigurement, emotional distress, loss of
consortium, loss of society and companionship, and destruction
of the parent-child relationship.
(2) The total recovery for noneconomic damages may not exceed
the amount determined in paragraph (4) for each occurrence
from all health care providers who are found negligent in provid-
ing health care services. The limit applies to any action filed on
or after (insert date) and before (insert later date).
(3) If any action subject to this section is tried before a jury, the
jury shall not be informed of the limitation in paragraph (4) of
this section.
(4) In no action subject to this section may a claimant recover a
judgment for noneconomic damages exceeding the amount de-
termined as follows:
(a) Any judgment for noneconomic damages not in excess of
$250,00081 shall be fully compensated.
An additional reason to retain the fault system is that so much of the structure and
process of tort law is dependent upon it. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra, at 32. For
example, the traditional purposes for imposing tort liability are twofold: deterrence and
compensation. Id. at 30. A no-fault system would directly thwart this most basic goal of
the tort system - deterrence - since liability would incur from both wrongful and benefi-
cial conduct. Id. at 32. Thus, an important tool for educating the public to distinguish
between beneficial and wrongful conduct (the punishment of wrongdoers) would no longer
be available to the legal system. Id.
Because the fault concept is deeply rooted in the present tort system and will not be
cast aside easily, R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 34, at 271, reformers attempting
to resolve the malpractice crisis should devise proposals that improve upon the existing
fault system.
179. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
181. The exact base amount remains with the discretion of legislatures. It must be
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(b) Any judgment in excess of $250,000 shall be limited by
adding to the $250,000 base amount 30 percent'82 of the dif-
ference between the actual judgment and the $250,000 base
amount.
(5) The limitation in paragraph (4) of this section applies to all
claims for noneconomic damages made by the claimant who in-
curred bodily injury as a result of medical malpractice. All de-
rivative claims are likewise included within the same limitation.
(6) The base amount in paragraph (4) of this section shall be
adjusted annually by the (insert appropriate official) to reflect
changes in the (insert appropriate index for inflation).
(7) Every award of damages within the section shall specify,
without regard to limit, the sum of money, if any, awarded for
noneconomic damages as defined in paragraph (1) of this
section.
V. ANALYSIS
Evaluating the merits of the proposal warrants a comparison
of its features with those of the Ohio, Wisconsin and Washington
provisions. Before examining the proposal's effectiveness, fairness
and desirability, and constitutionality in light of the shortcomings
and successes of the previously discussed statutes, a brief word on
the administration of the proposal is necessary. Notably, subsec-
tion (1) explicitly defines the limitation on noneconomic damages.
This specificity makes the proposal less confusing and easier to
administer than would a limit defined in vague terms such as
Ohio's limit on "general damages."' 8 a The proposal further facili-
tates administration by mirroring the Wisconsin requirement that
the jury award must specify noneconomic elements184 in para-
graph (7).
low enough, however, to permit the scale provision in subsection 4(b) to operate effectively.
182. Arriving at the 30 percent figure was purely arbitrary on the author's part. A
statistical determination of the appropriate percentage is beyond the scope of this Note,
and the ken of this author. It is assumed that the percentage will vary depending on the
severity of the crisis in a particular jurisdiction. The percentage should be set at that point
where the balance is struck between the interested parties, i.e., the insurance companies,
the providers of health care and the victims of medical malpractice. To avoid the problems
with the Ohio and Wisconsin provisions, that percentage must not be too low or too high.
183. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A. Effectiveness
Compared to the previously discussed caps, the proposal
strikes a middleground with respect to effectiveness. It is not as
effective as Ohio's $200,000 absolute cap at increasing the pre-
dictability of payouts for insurers.185 The "per occurrence" provi-
sion (paragraph (5)), however, aids in the prediction of the high-
est potential liability incurred from a single incident of
malpractice, because it subjects all the claims, direct and deriva-
tive, that might arise from that incident to a single limit.
With regard to the Wisconsin and Washington measures, the
proposal offers greater relief to insurers and the medical industry.
Unlike the Wisconsin statute, by acting on all claims above
$250,000, the proposal will have a much more significant impact
on the system than Wisconsin's $1,000,000 limit, which would
necessarily affect far fewer claims. Unlike the Washington stat-
ute, it is not necessary to predict rising incomes under the new
proposal.18 The predictability process, therefore, is simplified.
The proposal enhances predictability, then, because of the "per
occurrence" provision, the number of claims affected, and the sim-
plification of the actuarial process. The "risk premium" should be
less necessary, and premiums should stabilize as a result.
The proposal should also help eliminate the crisis because to-
tal payout is likely to decrease. Although Ohio's lower absolute
cap might better decrease the payout with respect to individual
claims, if Ohio had adopted a "per occurrence" provision in addi-
tion to the low, absolute cap, the dichotomy between the new pro-
posal and Ohio's statute would be even greater. Since the proposal
includes a "per occurrence" provision, it can possibly reduce the
total payout arising from a single incident better than Ohio's plan.
Despite any shortcomings the proposal may have compared to the
Ohio statute, the proposal should in most cases reduce total pay-
out much better than Wisconsin's $1,000,000 limit.187 Moreover,
185. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
186. Although companies must still make predictions under this proposal, it is losses
that must be calculated, instead of rising incomes. Since the prediction of losses is inti-
mately related to insurance companies' operations (at least much more so than the projec-
tion of rising incomes), the proposal's slidingscale sacrifices less predictability. The propo-
sal decreases the range of possible losses. It therefore enhances predictability by gauging
the cap mechanism to the figure to which existing actuarial processes are geared.
187. Both the proposal (paragraph (5)) and the Wisconsin statute, see supra notes
69-73 and accompanying text, contain "per occurrence" provisions limiting total payout for
all direct or derivative claims to one amount. They differ, of course, in the amount of the
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the proposal is gauged to the actual jury award and not the aver-
age wage and life expectancy of the victim. Because it is more
efficient than the Washington provision, 188 the proposal can better
reduce total payout. It should also be remembered that, under the
proposal, legislatures are able to adjust the operational percentage
within the formula to reduce the payout to the extent necessary to
alleviate the crisis.1 89
The sunset provision in paragraph (2) may also enhance ef-
fectiveness. Threatened with the expiration of their statutory pro-
tection, insurers will likely make a sincere effort to assure lower,
more stable premiums. Unlike Wisconsin statute,L90 the proposal
will affect enough cases to enable companies to be successful in
such an endeavor. Finally, the proposal follows the Wisconsin and
Washington provisions and avoids the "floor effect" of caps' 9' by
requiring juries to determine awards without knowledge of the
limitation.
B. Fairness and Desirability
Ultimately, the insurance companies would probably favor a
low, absolute cap similar to the one contained in the Ohio statute.
However, such a cap is not a realistic alternative because the bur-
dens imposed on the victims by a low, absolute cap are too great.
The proposed limitation is a more desirable alternative than either
the Wisconsin or Washington provisions. One reason is because
cap on noneconomic damages. Given that the average medical malpractice award in 1986
was, approximately, $1.5 million, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, and assuming
for illustration purposes that one hundred percent of that average represents noneconomic
damages, the proposal would reduce payout more than the Wisconsin statute. Wisconsin's
$1,000,000 cap will reduce the average award by $500,000. The proposal, however, will
reduce the average award by $875,000. (Under the proposal's sliding scale, the cap would
equal $250,000 plus 30 percent of the difference between $1.5 million and $250,000, or
$625,000.) Of course, some awards are so large, see supra note 14, that the proposal cap
would be higher than Wisconsin's. But these extremes are rare, and until the average
award for noneconomic damages increases to a great extent, the proposal cap will continue
to be more effective at reducing total payout.
188. Because the Washington scale is based on the average wage and the victim's life
expectancy, it could conceivably permit greater recovery than the injury warrants. See
supra text accompanying note 99. Assuming that the jury award reflects the actual injury
more accurately than the product of average income and life expectancy, basing the limit
on the jury award better assures that the victim will receive what he is due, and no more.
The proposal is less arbitrary than Washington's limit which ignores actual injury and
looks solely to average wage and life expectancy.
189. See supra note 182.
190. See supra text accompanying note 79.
191. See supra notes 76 & 86 and accompanying text.
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the proposal will affect enough cases to have an impact on the
crisis. While it is possible that predictability is not improved as
much as it is under Ohio's approach, it is definitely improved
more under the proposal than it is under either Wisconsin's or
Washington's plan. Insurance companies can actually reap the
benefits of the "per occurrence" and jury provisions that are only
theoretically possible under the high absolute cap used in Wiscon-
sin.192 Actuarial calculations are simpler than in Washington be-
cause companies do not have to predict rising incomes. Companies
may also reap financial benefits through decreased payout and
benefit to an even greater extent from the avoidance of the ineffi-
ciencies of the Washington scale. Although an absolute cap is the
most favorable measure, companies should also favor the present
proposal. Such a measure should affect predictability and payout
sufficiently to relieve them of the "squeeze" imposed by the crisis.
The medical industry would likely favor the low absolute cap
as well because malpractice insurance premiums are more likely
to be reduced. However, the present proposal should also ade-
quately meet the concerns raised by the medical profession. Its
effect on predictability and payout should result in lower, more
stable premiums. This in turn allows for greater profitability in a
medical practice, enabling health care providers to remain in cer-
tain areas of practice as well as in certain regions of the coun-
try. 9 Although the benefits are not as great as with a low abso-
lute cap, the health care industry should prefer the present
proposal over the Wisconsin or Washington provisions.
Of all the reform measures discussed in this Note, the pre-
ferred choice for the victim would be the $1,000,000 Wisconsin
cap because the burden is so small and it consequently affects
fewer cases than the other provisions would. Because a high abso-
lute. cap is an unacceptable reform because it does little to solve
the malpractice crisis, victims must sacrifice more than the Wis-
consin statute requires. Victims will prefer the present proposal
over the Ohio alternative. Unlike Ohio, the present proposal does
not remain stagnant: it increases with inflation, pursuant to para-
graph (6). Therefore, future victims will not be subjected to a
192. Although the "per occurence," and jury provisions in the Wisconsin statute are
beneficial to insurance companies, the severe limitation in the Wisconsin scheme repre-
sented by the $1,000,000 limit overshadows their effectiveness. See supra note 79 and ac-
companying text.
193. See supra notes 17 & 56.
[Vol. 40:825
TALE OF THREE DAMAGE CAPS
lower limit in real dollars. Victims enjoy a flexibility in awards
that an absolute cap does not offer,9 4 and the burden on the indi-
vidual is far less egregious than it is in Ohio.195
The sliding scale provision is also better tailored to compen-
sate the victim than is the Washington statute. The base amount
in subparagraph (4)(a) of the proposal protects the severely in-
jured from the affects of the factors in the variable sliding-scale
portion of the cap. 196 The present proposal, unlike the Washington
statute, differentiates between victims with respect to the type of
injury and the severity of the suffering because the scale directly
relates only to the jury award, which is likely to be the best avail-
able tool to account for these variables.9 Presumably, the fact-
finder will have at its disposal all relevant facts with respect to the
malpractice incident. In determining the award, the jury must ac-
count for the individual's characteristics, the type of injury suf-
fered, and the severity of the injury. The jury award may not be a
foolproof way to determine noneconomic loss. It is far superior in




Under the heightened rationality standard of review that has
been applied in some equal protection cases in which a damage
cap was challenged,19 this proposal should pass constitutional
muster. Like the three preceding statutes, the goal of this proposal
is to alleviate the medical malpractice crisis. Such a goal is legiti-
mate. 99 As a legislative means to achieve this goal, this proposal
194. Subparagraph (4)(b) allows at least 30 percent of the amount of the award cut
by the damage cap. An absolute cap, of course, precludes recovery of any award above the
limit.
195. The proposal contains a minimum cap of $250,000 (subparagraph (4)(a)) as
compared to an absolute $200,000 cap in Ohio.
196. Compare, for example, how low a cap can go under the Washington provision
when low annual wage and life expectancy figures are used to calculate the damage limit.
See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
197. Legislators in Washington have been criticized for basing the damage cap at
least in part on a factor, the state's average annual wage, that is irrelevant to the severity
of a victim's injuries and suffering. See Note, Constitutional Challenges to Washington's
Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and Death, 63 WASH. L.
REv. 653, 673 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Challenges].
198. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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should be constitutional. Courts that have invalidated previous
caps seemed most concerned that such schemes unduly burdened
the most seriously injured victims.20 0 These courts found it
"shocking" and "inconceivable" to force the victims to shoulder
the entire burden of supporting the medical industry. 01 The pro-
posal avoids this pitfall by reducing the burden that is imposed
upon the most seriously injured.
First, it is superior to the Ohio provision because a victim
who incurs noneconomic damages greater that $250,000 does not
sacrifice the entire amount in excess of the base amount. While
the Ohio cap would cut off all recovery at the arbitrary limit,20 2
under the proposed statute the victim receives some percentage of
that portion of the jury's damage award that exceeds the base
amount.203 Second, the proposal is superior to Washington's slid-
ing scale because the severity of the victim's injury remains a fac-
tor affecting the ultimate damage award, whereas by considering
only the victim's life expectancy and the average wage, the Wash-
ington provision completely ignores the severity of the injury.204
Under this proposal, however, the victim's damage award is ad-
justed upward in accordance with the amount of injury, as re-
flected in the jury's determination of the damages, which is made
without knowledge of the cap.
In considering the propriety of the legislative means, courts
must remember that damage limitations must necessarily prevent
some victims from full recovery.205 Reducing those with awards in
excess of $250,000 is justifiable because claims in this category
appear to be the cause of the rapid growth in malpractice settle-
ments and verdicts.20 6 By reflecting the severity of the injury in
the ultimate award, the fit between means and ends may be tight
enough to satisfy the heightened rationality standard.2 07 Because
200. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 139.
202. See supra note 39 and accompanying text..
203. See subparagraph (4)(b), supra note 182 and the accompanying text.
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
205. See Comment, State Legislative Responses, supra note 131, at 1419.
206. See An Update on the Liability Crisis, supra note 25, at 243.
207. The most successful equal protection challenges have been against statutes that
imposed absolute caps. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 930, 424 A.2d 825, 829
(1980) (invalidating a $250,000 absolute limit); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 128
(N.D. 1978) (invalidating a $300,000 absolute cap); Duren v. Suburban Community
Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc.2d 25, 27, 495 N.E.2d 51, 55 (C.P. 1985) (invalidating a $200,000
absolute cap). The proposed limitation in this Note is distinguishable from these other, less
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recoveries in this proposal are carefully limited to avoid the impo-
sition of an undue burden on any of the parties involved, the pro-
posal is much wiser and much more likely to survive an equal pro-
tection challenge.
2. Right to Trial by Jury
The proposed cap should not run afoul of federal or state jury
trial guarantees.2 08 Even if state courts follow Washington's lead
and decide to extend the protection of the right beyond the protec-
tion that courts have given under the seventh amendment to the
United States Constitution, or by the constitutions of other
states,209 the proposed cap should still pass muster.
The arguments advanced by critics of the Washington cap
are remedied by the proposal. One fear of these critics was that
the right to jury trial would be abridged by the damage limita-
tions: "It is of fundamental importance that this institution of the
'common man' survive to judge the rights and liabilities attaching
to tortious conduct. ' 210 The critics have argued that the damage
cap ignored the facts proven at the trial,21' and therefore invaded
"'the province of the jury.' ,,212
successful legislative efforts because it employs a sliding-scale methodology to establish the
limit in each case. More importantly, however, the sliding scale itself is designed to be a
narrowly tailored means to execute a legitimate, see supra note 125, government end: It
avoids the uniform application of an arbitrary and static legislative limit, allowing instead
the magnitude of the jury's award to be reflected in each case. Moreover, it avoids the
harsh results that might be experienced with the Washington sliding scale, see supra note
95 and accompanying text.
A consistent theme echoed by courts striking down damage limitations on equal pro-
tection grounds is that it is "simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of sup-
porting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severly injured
and therefore most in need of compensation." Duren, .24 Ohio Misc.2d at 28-29, 495
N.E.2d at 56 (quoting Carson, 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837); see also Arneson, 270
N.W.2d at 136 ("Restrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to enter into practice
and remain in practice, but do so only at the expense of claimants with meritorious
claims."). The cap proposed herein definitively leaves the decision as to which claims are
meritorious where it belongs: with the jury. By granting 30 percent of the award for
noneconomic damages above the $250,000 minimum cap, the proposal reflects the severity,
as determined by the jury, of the plaintiff's claim.
208. See supra notes 153-76 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
210. Wiggins & Caldwell, Liability-Limiting Legislation: An Impermissible Intru-
sion Into the Jury's Right to Decide, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 723, 732 (1986-87).
211. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 197, at 673 (arguing that
taking into account only the age and the state average wage fails to reflect the seriousness
of the injury).
212. Id. at 674 (quoting Boyd v. Bulala, 674 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986)).
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The proposed cap should first alleviate fears of the disappear-
ance of "the common man." At the center of the proposal is the
traditional American jury. The jury determines the severity of the
injuries when, without being informed of the limitation on dam-
ages, it sets the damage award. That determination of severity re-
mains after operation of the statute because each damage deter-
mination is reduced by an equal percentage. The proposal allows
legislatures to exercise their powers to limit the remedies available
in causes of action, and at the same time it assures the continued
importance of the jury system in American jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Establishing damage limitations necessarily involves a bal-
ance between insurability and compensation. To alleviate the cri-
sis wisely, each interested party must make some sacrifices. Under
the present proposal, the insurance and health care industries sac-
rifice some of the effects that an absolute cap has on predictability
and payout. The victims sacrifice the ability to recover unlimited
damage awards. In striking this balance, the present proposal does
not burden the victim too much or too little. Instead it establishes
a compromise between the interested parties that is finally, just
right.
AMANDA E. HAIDUC
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